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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years , a number of non-compl iance procedures have been 
adopted in the context of multi lateral environmental treaties to address the 
risk of non-fulfilment of treaty obligations by Contract ing Parties. The 
pr imary objective of these procedures is to encourage or assist States in the 
implementat ion of their obligations and, in the event of non-compl iance , to 
avoid the confrontation that might result from resort to means such as dispute 
set t lement procedures , invocation of State responsibili ty, coun te rmeasures 1 . 
1. On the development of non-compliance mechanisms and procedures in 
international environmental law see in particular: CHAYES, A. and CHAYES, A. H . : 
"On Compliance", International Organization, 1 9 9 3 , pp. 1 7 5 ff.; KUMMER: 
"Providing Incentives to Comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An 
Alternative to Sanctions?", European Environmental Law Review, 1 9 9 4 , pp. 2 5 6 ff.; 
BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES: "La mise en oeuvre du droit international dans le domaine 
de la protection de l'environnement: enjeux et défis", Revue Genérale de Droit Int. 
Public, 1 9 9 5 , pp. 3 7 ff.; SZELL: "The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for 
Monitoring Compliance", in LANG (ed.): Sustainable Development and International 
Law, London, 1 9 9 5 , pp. 9 7 ff.; BOTHE: 'The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms 
in International Environmental Law", in WOLFRUM (ed.): Enforcing Environmental 
Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means?, Berlin, 1 9 9 6 , p. 1 3 ff.; 
CAMERON, WERKSMAN and RODERICK (eds.): Improving Compliance with 
International Environmental Law, London, 1 9 9 6 ; LANG: "Compliance Control in 
International Environmental Law: Institutional Necessities", ZAÓRV, 1 9 9 6 , p. 6 8 5 ff.; 
KOSKENNIEMI: "New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation Control and 
Reaction", in WERKSMAN (ed.): Greening International Institutions, London, 1 9 9 6 , 
p. 2 3 6 ff.; MARAUHN: "Towards a Procedural Law of Compliance Control in 
International Environmental Relations", ZAÓRV, 1 9 9 6 , p. 6 9 6 ff.; SAND: "Institution-
Building to Assist Compliance with International Environmental Law: Perspectives", 
ZAÓRV, 1 9 9 6 , p. 7 7 4 ff.; SANDS: "Compliance with International Environmental 
Obligations: Existing International Legal Arrangements", in CAMERON, WERKSMAN 
and RODERICK (eds.): Improving Compliance, cit. p. 4 8 ff.; "Implementation, 
Compliance and Effectiveness", ASIL Proceedings of the 91" Annual Meeting, 1 9 9 7 , 
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The establ ishment of these procedures is becoming a frequent pract ice in 
the context of certain global environmental treaties which are binding on a 
large number of States with non-comparable economic , social and cultural 
condit ions. W h e r e the cause of non- implementa t ion is rooted in lack of 
capacity or inadvertence, co-operat ion and amicable solutions are thought to 
be particularly well suited to help a party to come into compl iance with its 
commi tments whi le the integrity of the environmental treaty reg ime is fully 
protected. 
The proliferation of new procedures on non-compl iance is hardly 
peculiar to global environmental treaties. Dur ing the last decade , a significant 
development of non-compl iance procedures has been taking place within the 
sphere of regional environmental agreements . S o m e of them operate with 
success and do serve their purpose, i.e., to counteract , by means of co -
operat ive approaches , the symptoms and causes of failure by Parties in the 
implementa t ion of, and compl iance with, their obligations. 
The following survey is an updated version of a report that the author 
drafted in 2003 for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to examine the 
relationship be tween the non-compl iance regimes which already operate or 
will shortly c o m e into operat ion under global and regional environmental 
p. 5 0 ff.; "Compliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical 
Evidence", ibidem, p. 2 3 4 ff.; HANDL: "Compliance Control Mechanisms and 
International Environmental Obligations", Tulane Journal of International and 
Compararive Law, 1 9 9 7 , p. 2 9 ff.; SZELL: "Compliance Regimes for Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements - A Progress Report", Environmental Policy and Law, 
1 9 9 7 , p. 3 0 4 ff.; CHINKIN: "Alternative Dispute Resolution under International Law", 
in EVANS (ed.): Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma, Oxford, 
1 9 9 8 , p. 1 2 3 ff.; VICTOR, RAUSTIALA and SKOLNIKOFF (eds.): The Implementation and 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, Cambridge, 1 9 9 8 ; 
WOLFRUM: Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International 
Environmental Law, Recueil des Cours, 1 9 9 8 , Vol. 2 7 2 , p. 2 5 ff.; BROWN WEISS: 
"Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The 
Baker's Dozen Myths", University of Richmond Law Review, 1 9 9 9 , p. 1 5 5 5 ff.; 
CHURCHILL and UFSTEIN: "Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law", 
American Journal of International Law, 2 0 0 0 , p. 6 2 3 , 6 4 3 - 6 4 7 ; FITZMAURICE and 
REDGWELL: "Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law", 
Netherlands Yerabook of International Law, 2 0 0 0 , p. 3 5 ff.; ROBEN: "Institutional 
Developments under Modern International Environmental Agreements", MPYUNL, 
2 0 0 0 , p. 3 6 3 ff.; EHRMANN: "Procedures of Compliance Control in International 
Environmental Treaties", Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy, 2 0 0 2 , p. 1 1 7 ff.; NOLLKAEMPER: "Compliance Control in International 
Environmental Law: Traversing the Limits of the National Legal Order", Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law, 2 0 0 2 , p. 1 6 5 ff.; CROSSEN: "Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum", The Georgetown Int. 
Environmental Law Review, 2 0 0 4 , p. 4 7 3 ff. 
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treaties and the proposed Centre for the Prevent ion and M a n a g e m e n t of 
Environmenta l Disputes , whose establ ishment was officially proposed by 
Italy in some European Communi ty fora during the same y e a r 2 . 
T h e survey is composed of two parts . Part one contains: 1) a short 
descript ion of the relevant precedents and progressive developments in the 
context of global and regional environmental treaties, with a short description 
of the related institutional and procedural aspects of the reg imes concerned 
(paras. 2-4); 2) a concise analysis of the Italian proposal (para. 5) . The 
purpose of Part two (para. 6) is twofold: 1) to explore possible conflicts and 
overlappings be tween existing non-compl iance procedures and the functions 
of the proposed Centre for the Prevent ion and M a n a g e m e n t of Environmenta l 
Disputes ; 2) to check whether the tasks performed by the proposed Centre 
might fill one or more gaps in the present reg ime of compl iance with 
international environmental treaties. 
2. NON-COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED 
WITHIN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
The deve lopment of new mechan isms to deal with non-compl iance in 
multilateral environmental treaties includes, at the world level, the following 
instances: 
— the Protocol on Substances that Deple te the Ozone Layer (Montreal , 
16 September 1987), hereinafter: Montrea l P ro toco l 3 , entered into 
force on 1st January 1989; 
— the Convent ion on the Control of Transboundary Movemen t s of 
Hazardous Was tes and Their Disposal (Basel, 22 March 1989), 
hereinafter: Basel Conven t ion 4 , entered into force on 5 M a y 1992; 
— the Protocol to the Uni ted Nat ions F ramework Convent ion on 
Cl imate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997), hereinafter: Kyoto 
P ro toco l 5 , not yet in force. 
2. See infra, para. 5 
3. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in BURHENNE (ed.): Beitrage zur 
Umweltgestaltung, International Environmental Law - Multilateral Treaties, Berlin, 
from 1974 (loose-leaf) (hereinafter: BIT), BU: 985:22/A. 
4. The text of the Convention is reproduced in BU, 989:22. 
5. For the text of the Kyoto Protocol see BU, 992:35/A. 
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The procedural mechan isms and the institutional f ramework of non-
compl iance reg imes envisaged under these instruments will be briefly 
reviewed under the following scheme: a im of the procedure , institutional 
f ramework, tr iggering mechanism, gathering of information, ou tcome of the 
procedure and operat ion of the non-compl iance reg ime in practice. Res-
trictions are inevitably brought about by this schematizat ion, which obviously 
prevents any exhaust ive description and analysis of different non-compl iance 
procedures . The articulation of the survey under few headings, however , a ims 
at a specific purpose: i.e., to grasp the essential features of different m e -
chanisms and facilitate their comparison. 
2 . 1 . The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer 
The Montreal Protocol , to which 185 States and the European Union are 
bound (information updated as at 8 March 2004) , establishes precise 
quantitative restrictions in the production and use of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and other ozone-deplet ing substances. T h e non-compl iance procedure 
of the Montrea l Protocol is the first mechan i sm of this kind in international 
environmental law and is still widely regarded as a model for other 
multi lateral environmental a g r e e m e n t s 6 . 
"Procedures and institutional mechan isms for determining non-
compl iance with the provisions of this Protocol and for t reatment of Part ies 
found to be in non-compl iance" , as requested by Art. 8 of the Montrea l 
Protocol , were agreed by the fourth meet ing of the Parties to the Montrea l 
Protocol in 1992 (decision I V / 5 7 ) and slightly modified in 1998 (decision 
6. On the non-compliance procedure under the Montreal Protocol see: 
KOSKENNIEMI: "Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforce-
ment of the Montreal Protocol", Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 1 9 9 2 , 
p. 1 2 3 ff.; LANG: "Compliance-Control in Respect of the Montreal Protocol", ASIL 
Proceedings of the 89"' Annual Meeting (April 5 - 8 , 1 9 9 5 ) , p. 2 0 6 ff.; WERKSMAN: 
"Compliance and Transition: Russia's Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime", 
ZAÓRV, 1 9 9 6 , p. 7 5 0 ff.; EHRMANN: Procedures cit., p. 1 2 9 - 1 5 4 ; YOSHIDA: "Soft 
Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance Procedure and the 
Functions of Internal International Institutions", Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy, 1 9 9 9 , p. 9 5 ff. 
7 . Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Copenhagen, 2 3 - 2 5 November 1 9 9 2 ) , 
decision IV/5, http://www.unep.Org/ozone/mop/04mop/4mop-15.e.shtml. 
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X / 1 0 8 ) . Dur ing this last meet ing the Parties decided to revise the non-
compl iance procedure under the Montrea l Protocol not later than 2003 . In 
2002 the representat ive of the United States proposed amendments to the non-
compl iance procedure in order to enable the Implementa t ion Commi t tee to 
meet its obligations to the Parties in a more t imely and effective manner . 
However , taking into account the lack of agreement of the other Part ies on all 
e lements of the proposal , the Uni ted Sta tes ' delegat ion dec ided to wi thdraw 
i t 9 . 
Objectives: The a im of the procedure is to secure an amicable solution 
of matters of possible non-compl iance . 
Institutional mechanisms: A n Implementa t ion Commi t t ee (hereinafter: 
I m p C o m , consist ing of 10 Part ies elected by the meet ing of the Part ies for 
two years on the basis of equitable geographical d i s t r ibu t ion 1 0 ) is entrusted 
with the task to identify the facts and possible causes relating to cases of non-
compl iance referred to it and to report to the Meet ing of the Part ies with 
appropriate recommendat ions . The I m p C o m has also the task to report and 
m a k e appropriate recommendat ions to the Meet ing of the Part ies in situations 
where there has been a persistent pattern of non-compl iance by a Party. 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure: The non-
compl iance procedure may be invoked by: 
— one or more Parties to the Montreal Protocol in respect of another 
Pa r ty ' s implementa t ion of its obligations; 
— a Party in respect to itself (despite its best, bona fide efforts, a Party 
that concludes it is unable to comply fully with is own obligations 
under the Protocol) ; 
— the Secretariat in respect to any Party to the Montreal Protocol 
(during the preparation of its reports under the Protocol , if the 
Secretariat becomes aware of possible non-compl iance by any Party 
with the Pro tocol ' s provisions) . 
8. Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Cairo, 23-24 November 1998), 
http://www. unep. org/ozone/mop/10mop/l 0mop-9.e. shtml. 
9. Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Rome, 25-29 November 2002), 
http://www.unep.Org/ozone/mop/l4mop/14mop-9.e.pdf. 
10. From 1 January 2003, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Ghana and Jamaica 
will be members of the Implementation Committee for a one year period; from the 
same date Honduras, Italy, Lituania, Maldives and Tunisia will be members for a two 
year period, Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties (Rome, 25-29 November 2002), 
decision XIV-12. 
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Information gathering: The I m p C o m bases its deliberations on 
information submit ted by the Part ies and any other information forwarded by 
the Secretariat . It can also request further information on matters under its 
considerat ion through the Secretariat and, with the authorization of the Party 
concerned, collect information in the territory of that Party. The I m p C o m has 
also the duty to maintain an exchange of information with the Execut ive 
Commi t tee of the Multi lateral Fund in relation to the provision of financial 
and technical assistance to Parties. A s far as developing countr ies are 
concerned, in 1994 the Part ies to the Montrea l Protocol decided to strengthen 
the report ing requirements on developing countr ies classified under Art . 5 of 
the Montreal Protocol . A developing country that enjoys this status will lose it 
"if it does not report baseyear data as required by the Protocol within one year 
of the approval of its country p r o g r a m m e and its institutional s t rengthening by 
the Execut ive Commit tee , unless o therwise decided by a Meet ing of the 
P a r t i e s " 1 1 . 
Outcome: The indicative list of measures that might be taken by a 
Meet ing of the Part ies after receiving a report by the I m p C o m includes: "A) 
appropriate assistance, including assistance for the collection and report ing of 
data, technical assistance, technology transfer and financial assistance, 
information transfer and training; B) issuing caut ions; C) suspension, in 
accordance with the applicable rules of international law concerning the 
suspension of the operat ion of a treaty, of specific r ights and privi leges under 
the Protocol , whether or not subject to t ime limits, including those concerned 
with industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfer of 
technology, financial mechan i sm and institutional a r rangements" (Annex V to 
decision IV/5 of 1992). 
Practice: T h e non-compl iance procedure of the Montrea l Protocol is 
fully operational . Since 1995 several cases have been reported by the 
I m p C o m to the Meet ing of the Part ies. The first cases involved eastern 
European countries, the so-called countr ies with economies in transition 
(Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, the Russian Federat ion, Ukraine) . 
T h e Russian Federat ion was found in non-compl iance with the phase out 
benchmarks for 1999 and 2000 for the product ion and consumpt ion of ozone-
depleting substances in Annex A to the Montrea l Protocol . After successive 
recommendat ions of the I m p C o m and decisions of the Meet ing of the Parties, 
11. Decision VI/5, adopted during the Sixth meeting of the Parties (Nairobi, 6-7 
October 1994), para, (a) (Hi), Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7 of 10 October 1994, 
http://www. unep. org/ozone/mop/06mop/6mop/6mop-7e. shtml. 
246 
PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
in 2002 the Part ies declared that the Russian Federat ion had returned to 
compl iance with its o b l i g a t i o n s 1 2 . 
The grace period for the developing countr ies provided for by Art . 5 of 
the Protocol ended in 1999. Since that year, also these countries have to 
comply with the control measures . In 2002 , in accordance with i tem B of the 
indicative list of measures , the Part ies caut ioned Albania, Bahamas , 
Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina , Cameroon , Ethiopia, 
Libya, Maldive , Namibia , Nepal , Nigeria and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines that in the event they had failed to return to compl iance in a 
t imely manner with regard to the phase-out of ozone deplet ing substances, the 
Part ies would have considered measures consistent with i tem C of the 
indicative list of measures . "These measures m a y include the possibility of 
actions available under Art icle 4 , such as ensuring that the supply of C F C s 
(that is the subject of non-compl iance) is ceased and that the export ing parties 
are not contributing to a continuing situation of n o n - c o m p l i a n c e " 1 3 . In 2003 
the I m p C o m acknowledged that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had failed 
to provide a plan of act ion despite an explicit request to do s o 1 4 . However , the 
Commi t tee "unders tood the pressing environmental problems faced by such 
small is lands States, and noted with appreciat ion the work done by U N E P in 
working with the country on a plan of a c t i o n " 1 5 . The progress of Albania , 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon , Guatemala , Honduras , Libya, 
Mald ives , Namibia , Papua N e w Guinea, Uganda and Uruguay in the 
implementa t ion of their plan of actions is closely m o n i t o r e d 1 6 . 
12. Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties (Rome, 25-29 November 2002), decision 
XIX/35. On the case of the Russian Federation see WERKSMAN: "Compliance and 
Transition: Russia's Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime", ZAORV, 1996, p. 
750 ff. 
13. Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties (Rome, 25-29 November 2002), decisions 
XIV/18-26; XIV/30; XIV/32-34. 
14. Report of the Fiftienth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Nairobi, 10-14 November 2003), Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/9 of 11 November 2003, http://www.unep.org/ozone/mop/15mop/ 
15mop-9.eadvancedcopy.pdf para. 140. 
15. Ibidem, para. 141. 
16. See Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance 
Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of Its Thirty-First Meeting, Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/31/3 of 13 November 2003, Annex, p. 32 ff. 
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2.2. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
The Basel Convent ion is principally devoted to the control of the 
movemen t s of hazardous wastes across international frontiers. It is based on 
the principle that States should take necessary measures to ensure that 
t ransboundary movement s of hazardous wastes are consistent with the 
protection of human health and the environment , whatever the place of their 
disposal. 158 States and the European Union are currently bound to this 
Convent ion (information updated as at 8 March 2003) . 
Art . 19 of the Basel Convent ion regulates a "verification procedure" , 
according to which if a Party has reason to believe that another Party is 
infringing its obligations under the Convent ion it may inform the Secretariat 
and the Party against w h o m the allegations are made . The Secretariat is under 
the duty to transmit the Parties all the relevant information received under this 
provision, but Art. 19 is silent about any further action that can be under taken 
by the Part ies to secure implementat ion of and compl iance with the 
Convent ion. 
In December 1999, while the negotiat ions for the adoption of a Protocol 
on Liability and Compensa t ion for D a m a g e result ing from Transboundary 
Movemen t s of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal were under con-
c l u s i o n 1 7 , the Fifth Conference of the Part ies decided to establish a Legal 
Work ing Group ( L W G ) with the mandate , inter alia, to finalize a proposal for 
establishing a mechan i sm on implementa t ion of and compl iance with the 
obligations of the Basel Convent ion. The revised text of a draft decision 
prepared by the L W G was adopted by the Sixth Conference of the Part ies to 
the Basel Convent ion ( C O P 6) on 14 December 2 0 0 2 1 8 . T h e mechan i sm 
operates without prejudice to the procedure on sett lement of disputes esta-
blished by the Basel Convent ion. 
Objectives: The Mechan i sm for Promot ing Implementa t ion and Com-
pliance pursues the a im " to assist Part ies to comply with their obligations 
under the Convent ion and to facilitate, p romote , moni tor and a im to secure 
17. The Protocol was adopted by the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Basel 
Convention on 10th December 1999. For the text of the Protocol see BU, 989:22/B. 
18. Doc. UNEP/CHW.6/CRP. 12 of 11 December 2002. On the non-compliance 
procedure under the Basel Convention see: SHIBATA: The Basel Compliance 
Mechanism, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 
2003, p. 183 ff. 
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the implementa t ion of and compl iance with the obligations under the Con-
vent ion". The mechan i sm is non-confrontat ional , t ransparent , cost-effective 
and preventive in nature, s imple, flexible and not-binding. 
Institutional mechanisms: The mechan ism is adminis tered by a C o m -
mit tee , the Commi t t ee for Implementa t ion and Compl iance (hereinafter: the 
Commit tee ) , consist ing of 15 experts in different subject matters (i.e., scien-
tific, technical , socio-economic , or legal fields) covered by the Convent ion. 
The member s of the Commi t tee are elected by the Conference of the Part ies 
on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. The Commi t tee is 
entrusted with the task to identify the facts and possible causes relating to 
cases of non-compl iance referred to it and give assistance to Part ies in their 
resolution. 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure: The non-
compl iance procedure may be invoked by: 
— a Party to the Basel Convent ion that has concerns or is affected by a 
failure to comply with and implement the Conven t ion ' s obligation by 
another Party with w h o m it is directly involved under the Con-
vention; 
— a Party in respect to itself (despite its best, bona fide efforts, the 
Party concludes it is unable to fully implement or comply with is 
own obligations under the Convent ion) ; 
— the Secretariat in respect to any Party to the Basel Convent ion, if it 
becomes aware that a Party is incurring difficulties in complying 
with its report ing obligations under Art . 13, para. 3 , of the Con-
vention, provided that the matter has not been resolved within three 
months by consultat ion with the Party concerned. 
Information gathering: The Commi t tee shall base its deliberations on 
information provided by: 
— the national reports submit ted by the Parties under Art. 13 of the 
Basel Convent ion; 
— the Party concerned; 
— all the Part ies through the Secretariat; 
— other bodies of the Convent ion and the Secretariat; 
— any sources and outside expert ise, either with the consent of the 
Party concerned or as directed by the Conference of the Parties. 
Wi th the authorization of the Party concerned, the Commi t t ee can also 
collect information in the territory of that Party. 
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Outcome: The mechan i sm under review envisages two different sets of 
measures which can be adopted by the Commi t tee : the "facilitation pro-
cedure" and "addit ional measures" . Under the "facilitation procedure" , the 
Commi t t ee m a y assist a Party with advice, non-binding recommenda t ions and 
information relat ing to, for instance: 
— the establ ishment or the strengthening of national or regional regu-
latory reg imes ; 
— facilitation of financial and technical assistance, including tech-
nology transfer and capacity building, in part icular to developing 
countr ies and countries with economies in transition; 
— elaborat ion with the co-operat ion of the Party concerned, voluntary 
compl iance action plans and review their implementat ion. 
Measures other than those listed above should be adopted in agreement 
with the Party concerned. 
In addition to the measures envisaged under the facilitation procedure , 
"addit ional measu res" m a y be r ecommended by the Commi t tee to the 
Conference of the Part ies to address a Pa r ty ' s compl iance difficulties. Such 
measures include: 
— further support for the Party concerned, including prioritarization of 
technical assistance and capaci ty-building and access to financial 
resources ; 
— issuing a caut ionary s tatement and providing advice regarding future 
compl iance in order to help Part ies to implement the provisions of 
the Basel Convent ion and to p romote co-operat ion be tween all 
Part ies. 
The Commi t tee may also decide not to proceed with a submission which 
it considers de min imis or manifestly ill-founded. 
Practice: The first meet ing of the Commi t t ee was held in Geneva on 19 
October 2003 , but the report was not m a d e publicly a v a i l a b l e 1 9 . 
19. The Implementation and Compliance Committee is not open to all Parties. 
Therefore, the report is made available only to the members of the Committee. 
Information provided by the Secretariat of the Basel Convention to the author on 5th 
December 2003. 
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2.3. Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
The Kyoto Protocol supplements and strengthens the United Nat ions 
F ramework Convent ion on Cl imate Change (New York, 9 M a y 1992), 
hereinafter: U N F C C 2 0 , whose basic a im is " to achieve stabilization of green-
house gas concentrat ions in the a tmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cl imate sys tem" (Art. 2) . The 
Kyoto Protocol establishes a set of general commi tmen t s for all Part ies and 
detailed legally binding emission reduction targets for certain greenhouse 
gases for Annex I Part ies. The Protocol is not yet entered into f o r c e 2 1 . 
Art. 18 of the Kyoto Protocol calls on the Conference of the Parties to 
the U N F C C , serving as the meet ing of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(hereinafter: C O P ) , to approve, at its first session: "appropria te and effective 
procedures and mechan i sms to determine and to address cases of non-
compl iance with the provisions of this Protocol , including through the 
development of an indicative list of consequences , taking into account the 
cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compl iance" . At C O P 4 (Buenos 
Aires , N o v e m b e r 1998), Parties established a jo in t working group to develop 
a compl iance system under the Protocol . At C O P 7 (Marrakesh, 29 October -
10 November 2001) , the Parties reached agreement on the Kyoto Protocol 's 
compl iance mechan i sm (decision 2 4 / C P . 7 ) 2 2 . 
20. BU, 992:35. 
21. The Kyoto Protocol shall enter into force when two conditions have been 
met: 1) ratification by 55 States; 2) ratifying governments must include developed 
countries representing at least 55% of that group's 1990 carbon dioxide emissions. 
The first requirement is met: 102 States and the European Union have ratified, 
accepted or approved the Protocol (situation updated at 31 s 1 January 2003). However, 
at the same date, developed countries ratifications accounted for 43,7% of 1990 C 0 2 
emissions as determined when the Protocol was adopted. The ratification of the 
Russian Federation (with its 17,4% of emissions) will be essential for the entry into 
force of the Protocol. 
22. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session (Marrakesh, 
29 October-10 November 2001), Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 of 21 January 2002, 
p. 64 ff., http://maindb.unfcc.int/library/?screen=list&FLDO=%25T&OPRO= 
contains&VALO=24/CP.7. On the non-compliance procedure under the Kyoto 
Protocol see: OTT: "Elements of a Supervisory Procedure for the Climate Regime", 
ZAÓRV, 1996, p. 732 ff.; WERKSMAN: "Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building 
a Backbone into a "Flexible" Regime", Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 
1998, p. 48 ff.; WISER: "Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch", 
International Environment Reporter Current Report, 16 January 2002, 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/lNER Compliance.pdf, W A N G and WISER: "The 
Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate Change Convention and 
251 
LAURA PINESCHI 
Objectives: The a im of the procedure is to provide "ear ly-warning" of 
cases where a Party is in danger of not complying with: (i) its emission 
targets; (ii) its moni tor ing and report ing requirements ; or (iii) its eligibility 
requirements for part icipating in the international emiss ions trading system 
a m o n g different Part ies to the Protocol and secure an amicable solution of 
matters of possible non-compl iance . The non-compl iance procedure operates 
without prejudice to the procedure on set t lement of disputes established by 
the U N F C C C . 
Institutional mechanisms: The compl iance regime consists of a C o m -
pliance Commi t tee (composed by 20 members , serving in their individual 
capacit ies) m a d e up of two branches: a Facil i tative Branch and an Enforce-
ment Branch. The Facili tative Branch a ims to provide advice and assistance 
to Parties in implement ing the Protocol and for promot ing compl iance with 
the Protocol . It also provides "ear ly-warning" of cases where a Party is in 
danger of not complying with its emission targets. The Enforcement Branch 
has the power to determine whether Part ies are not complying with their 
emission target or report ing requirements . Both branches are composed of 10 
member s , including one representat ive from each of the five regional groups 
of the United Nat ions (Africa, Asia, Latin Amer ica and the Car ibbean, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Others) , one from the 
small island developing States, two member s from Parties included in Annex 
I and two member s from non-Annex I Part ies. 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure. A potential com-
pl iance problem ("questions of implementa t ion") can be raised by: 
— an expert review team entrusted by Art. 8 of the Kyoto Protocol to 
review information submit ted the Part ies; 
— a Party with respect to another Party; 
— a Party with respect to itself. 
Information gathering: Each branch of the Compl iance Commi t t ee shall 
base its deliberations on information provided by: 
— the reports of the expert review teams; 
— the Party concerned; 
its Kyoto Protocol", RECIEL, 2 0 0 2 , p. 1 8 1 ff.; BRUNNÉE: 'The Kyoto Protocol: 
Testing Ground for Compliance Theories?", ZAÓRV, 2 0 0 3 , p. 2 5 5 ff.; URBINATI: 
"Non-Compliance Procedure under the Kyoto Protocol", Baltic Yearbook of 
International Law, 2 0 0 3 , p. 2 2 9 ff. 
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— the Party that has submit ted a quest ion of implementa t ion with 
respect to another Party; 
— reports of the C O P s and the subsidiary bodies of the U N F C C and the 
Kyoto Protocol ; 
— the other branch; 
— intergovernmental and non-governmenta l organisat ions; 
— experts invited to give their advice. 
Outcome: The Facili tative Branch can decide on the adoption of one or 
more of the following measures : 
— give advice and facilitation of assistance to individual Part ies re-
garding the implementat ion of the Protocol; 
— mobi l ize financial and technical assistance to any Party concerned; 
— formulate recommendat ions . 
The Enforcement Branch can adopt different measures according to the 
commi tmen t s which have not been met by the Party concerned. If the 
Enforcement Branch determines that a Party has not compl ied with Art. 5, 
para. 1 or 2, or Art . 7, para. 1 or 4 , of the Protocol , it can adopt the following 
measures : 
— declaration of non-compl iance ; 
— deve lopment of a plan, which includes: an analysis of the cause of 
non-compl iance , measures that the Party intends to implement in 
order to r emedy the non-compl iance and a t imetable for imple-
ment ing such measures . 
If the Enforcement Branch determines that a Party included in Annex I 
does not mee t one or more of the eligibility requirements under Arts . 6, 12 
and 17 of the Protocol , it can suspend the eligibility of that Party. 
If the Enforcement Branch determines that the emiss ions of a Party have 
exceeded its assigned amount , the following consequences can occur: 
— deduction from the Pa r ty ' s assigned amount for the second com-
mi tment period of a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 t imes the amount 
in tonnes of excess emiss ions; 
— development of a compl iance action plan, which includes: an ana-
lysis of the cause of non-compl iance , the action that the Party intends 
to implement in order to mee t its quantified emiss ion limitation or 
reduction commi tmen t in the subsequent commit t ing period; and a 
t imetable for implement ing such measures ; 
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— suspension of the eligibility to m a k e transfers under Art. 17 of the 
Protocol until the Enforcement Branch has reinstated that eligibility. 
In the case of non-compl iance with emiss ion targets, the Party can lodge 
an appeal to the C O P if that Party believes it has been denied due process . If 
the C O P agrees to overr ide the decision of the Enforcement Branch, the 
mat ter of the appeal shall be referred back to the Enforcement Branch. 
Practice: As the Kyoto Protocol has not yet entered into force, the 
impact of its non-compl iance procedure remains to be seen. 
3 . NON-COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED 
WITHIN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
T h e development of new mechan i sms to deal with non-compl iance in 
multi lateral environmental treaties include, at the regional level, the following 
instances: 
— the Convent ion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(Geneva, 13 November 1979), hereinafter: L R T A P C o n v e n t i o n 2 3 , 
entered into force on 16 March 1983; 
— the Convent ion on the Protect ion of the Alps (Salzburg, 7 N o v e m b e r 
1991), hereinafter: Alpine C o n v e n t i o n 2 4 , entered into force on 6 
March 1995; 
— the Convent ion for the Protection of the Mar ine Envi ronment of the 
North-East Atlantic (Paris, 22 Sep tember 1992), hereinafter: O S P A R 
C o n v e n t i o n 2 5 , entered into force on 25 M a r c h 1998; 
— the Convent ion on Access to Information, Publ ic Participation in 
Decis ion-making and Access to Just ice in Environmenta l Mat ters 
(Árhus , 25 June 1998), hereinafter: Árhus C o n v e n t i o n 2 6 , entered into 
force on 30 October 2 0 0 1 . 
23. BU, 979:84. 
24. BU, 991:83. 
25. BU,992:1\. 
26. BU, 998:48. 
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3.1 . Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
T h e scope of the L R T A P Convent ion is to limit emiss ions of polluting 
substances into the a tmosphere in the European and North Amer ican regions 
covered by the United Nat ions Economic Commiss ion ( U N E C E ) . L R T A P , 
which binds 48 States and the European Union (information updated as at 18 
February 2004) , is a f ramework convent ion comple ted by eight Protocols: the 
Protocol on L o n g - T e r m Financing of the Co-operat ive P rog ramme for 
Moni tor ing and Evaluat ion of the Long-Range Transmiss ion of Air Pollutants 
in Europe (Geneva, 28 September 1984), hereinafter: E M E P P r o t o c o l 2 7 , 
entered into force on 28 January 1988; the Protocol on the Reduct ion of 
Sulphur Emiss ions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent 
(Helsinki , 8 July 1985), hereinafter: First Sulphur P r o t o c o l 2 8 , entered into 
force on 2 September 1987; the Protocol concerning the Control of Nitrogen 
Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes (Sofia, 31 O c t o b e r l 9 8 8 ) , hereinafter: 
Nox P r o t o c o l 2 9 , entered into force on 14 February 1991; the Protocol 
concerning the Control of Emiss ions of Volati le Organic Compounds or their 
Transboundary Fluxes (Geneva, 18 November 1991), hereinafter: V O C 
P r o t o c o l 3 0 , entered into force on 29 September 1997; the Protocol on Further 
Reduct ion of Sulphur Emiss ions (Oslo, 14 June 1994), hereinafter: Second 
Sulphur P r o t o c o l 3 1 , entered into force on 5 August 1998; the Protocol on 
Heavy Meta ls (Árhus , 24 June 1 9 9 8 ) 3 2 , entered into force on 29 December 
2003 ; the Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Árhus , 25 June 1998) 
hereinafter: P O P s P r o t o c o l 3 3 , entered into force on 23 October 2003 ; the 
Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophicat ion and Ground-level Ozone 
(Gothenburg, 30 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 9 ) 3 4 , not yet in force. 
T h e establ ishment of a non-compl iance procedure was decided by the 
Execut ive Body of the L R T A P Convent ion in 1997 (Decision 1 9 9 7 / 2 ) 3 5 , in 
27. BU, 979:84/A. 
28. BU, 979:84/B. 
29. BU, 979:84/C. 
30. BU, 979:84/D. 
31. BU, 979:84/E. 
32. BU, 979:84/F. 
33. BU, 979:84/G. 
34. BU, 979:84/H. 
35. Decision 1997/2 concerning the Implementation Committee, Its Structure and 
Functions and Procedures for Review of Compliance, Report of the Fifteenth Session 
of the Executive Body, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/53, Annex III, http://www.unece.org/env/ 
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accordance with Art. 10, para. 2, of the Convent ion (which confers to the 
Execut ive Body the mandate to review the implementa t ion of the Con-
vention), Art. 3 , para. 3 , of the V O C Protocol (which requires the Parties to 
establish a mechan i sm for monitor ing compl iance with their commi tmen t s 
under the Protocol) , and Art. 7 of the 1994 Second Sulphur Protocol . The 
latter provides for the establ ishment of an Implementa t ion Commi t tee with 
the power to review implementa t ion and compl iance by the Parties with their 
obligations under the Protocol . This body "may decide upon and call for 
action to bring about full compl iance with the present Protocol , including 
measures to assist a Party's compl iance with the Protocol" . The non-
compl iance procedure regulated by Decis ion 1997/2 applies to all the L R T A P 
Protocols . A m e n d m e n t s to Decision 1997/2 were approved by the Execut ive 
Body in 2002 to bring the text of the decision into line with established 
p r a c t i c e 3 6 . 
Objectives: The 1997 Procedures for Review of Compl iance of the 
L R T A P Convent ion a im to bring about full compl iance with the Protocols to 
the Convent ion and assist Parties in the implementat ion of and compl iance 
with their commi tmen t s . The Procedures operate with no prejudice to the 
provisions of the Protocols on sett lement of disputes. 
Institutional mechanisms: The mechan i sm is adminis tered by the Imple-
mentat ion Commit tee , consist ing of 9 Parties to the L R T A P Convent ion. 
Each m e m b e r of the Commi t tee is a Party to, at least, one Protocol . The 
member s of the Commi t tee are elected by the Parties to the L R T A P Con-
vention for two years . The Implementa t ion Commi t tee has the task to review 
periodically compl iance by the Parties with their report ing requirements 
under the Protocols and to secure "a construct ive s o l u t i o n " 3 7 to cases of non-
compl iance referred to it. 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure: The non-com-
pliance procedure may be invoked by: 
— one or more Parties to a Protocol in respect of another Par ty ' s 
implementat ion of its obligations under that instrument; 
lrtap/conv/report/eb53_a3.htm. On the non-compliance procedure under the LRTAP 
Convention see: SZELL: Compliance Regimes cit., p. 3 0 4 ff. 
3 6 . Report of the Nineteenth Session of the Executive Body, Doc. ECE/EB. 
AIR/75 of 1 6 January 2 0 0 2 , Annex. 
3 7 . Decision 1 9 9 7 / 2 , Annex, para. 3 b). 
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— a Party in respect to itself (despite its best endeavours , a Party 
concludes it is unable to comply fully with its obligations under a 
Protocol) ; 
— the Secretariat in respect to any Party to a Protocol (during the 
revision of the reports submit ted by the Part ies in accordance with a 
Pro tocol ' s report ing requirements , the Secretariat becomes aware of 
possible non-compl iance by a Party with its obligations). 
Information gathering: The Implementa t ion Commi t tee bases its deli-
berat ions on the information provided by the Secretariat . It can also request 
further information on matters under its considerat ion through the Secretariat 
and, subject to the authorization of the Party concerned, collect information in 
the territory of that Party. 
Outcome: The Implementa t ion Commi t t ee reports and makes appro-
priate recommendat ions to the Execut ive Body. The Parties to the Protocol 
concerned, meet ing within the Execut ive Body, decide upon measures to 
bring about full compl iance with the Protocol in question, including measures 
to assist a Party in the effective compl iance with its obligations. 
Practice: The Procedures for Review of Compl iance under the L R T A P 
Convent ion is fully operational . For illustrative purposes only, a few cases 
shall be ment ioned. 
The first submission was received by the Implementa t ion Commi t tee in 
2000. It concerned the compl iance by Slovenia with the 1994 Second Sulphur 
Protocol: sulphur emiss ions rates originating from the Trbovlje plant (a coal-
fired power plant) could be in violation of a sulphur emission limit value 
required under the Protocol as of 2004. In 2000 the Execut ive Body adopted 
the recommendat ions of the Implementa t ion Commit tee . It noted the intention 
of Slovenia to adopt an ecological action p r o g r a m m e to reduce the sulphur 
emiss ions of the Trbovlje power plant and to shut down that plant. The 
Execut ive Body invited the Part ies to the 1994 Protocol to examine ways in 
which they could assist Slovenia in reducing emiss ions from the Trbovlje 
plant (for instance, through the provision of equipment) . Slovenia was invited 
to consider applying t imely measures to reduce sulphur emiss ions from the 
plant (for instance, using coal with a lower sulphur content, coal cleaning or 
establishing t ime restrictions on the operat ion of the plant over a y e a r ) 3 8 . 
38. Decision 2000/1, Report of the Eighteenth Session of the Executive Body, 
Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/71, Annex I. 
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In 2001 further decisions were adopted by the Execut ive Body on 
compl iance by Finland, Italy and Norway with the 1991 V O C Protocol . In 
relation to Norway , the Execut ive Body noted that the country was not 
fulfilling its obligations to take effective measures to reduce its annual 
emissions within the limits specified under Art . 2, para. 2 b) , and Annex I of 
the V O C Protocol . In particular, Norway would have been in non-compl iance 
for seven years , because its l icensing system for offshore oil loading facilities 
would not be brought it into compl iance before 2005 or 2 0 0 6 3 9 . In 2002, the 
Implementa t ion Commit tee , expressing disappointment on the fact that 
Norway had not been able to shorten the per iod of seven years it will remain 
in non-compl iance , r ecommended to the Execut ive Body to ask Norway to 
submit by 31 M a r c h 2003 "a report describing the progress it has m a d e 
towards compl iance and setting out a t imetable that specifies the year by 
which Norway expects to be in compl iance , lists the specific measures taken 
or scheduled to fulfil its emission reduct ion obligations under the V O C 
Protocol and sets out the projected effects of each of these measures on its 
V O C emiss ions up to and including the year of c o m p l i a n c e " 4 0 . Similar 
measures have been r ecommended to the Execut ive Commi t t ee in relation to 
Finland and I t a l y 4 1 . In 2004 Italy and Norway were still declared to be in 
non-compl iance with their obligations, whi le Finland was acknowledged to 
fulfil its obligations under the V O C P r o t o c o l 4 2 . 
In 2002 the Implementa t ion Commi t tee has also considered a situation 
submit ted by Sweden in relation to itself. The inability of Sweden to fully 
comply with the V O C Protocol is essentially caused by combust ion in small 
residential stoves that give a significant contribution to V O C e m i s s i o n s 4 3 . 
Dur ing the same year, situations concerning compl iance with the 1988 N O x 
39. Decision 2001/1, Report of the Nineteenth Session cit., supra note 36, Annex 
I . 
40. The Fifth Report of the Implementation Committee, Doc. EB.AIR/2002/2 of 
30 September 2002, p. 3. 
41. Ibidem, p. 5 and 6. All the recommendations submitted by the Imple-
mentation Committee were accepted by the Executive Body; see: Decisions 2002/2, 
2002/3 and 2002/4, in Report of the Twentieth Session of the Executive Body, Doc. 
ECE/EB.AIR/77 of 17 January 2003, Annexes III, IV and V. 
42. See Report of the Twenty-First Session of the Executive Body for the Con-
vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/79 of 21 
January 2004 and decisions 2003/1, 2003/2 and 2003/3 in Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/ 
79/Add. 1 of 6 January 2004. 
43. In 2004 the Implementation Committee recognized that Sweden had returned 
to compliance with its obligations under the VOC Protocol, see Report cit., supra note 
42, para. 26 and Decision 2003/4, adopted by the Executive Body on 6 January 2004, 
Doc. ECE/EB. AIR/79/Add. 1 of 6 January 2004. 
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Protocol by Greece , Ireland and Spain were referred to the Implementa t ion 
Commi t t ee by the Sec re t a r i a t 4 4 . In 2004 these States were still considered to 
be in non-compl iance with their o b l i g a t i o n s 4 5 . 
As far as compl iance by the Part ies with their report ing obligations is 
concerned, in 2002 a very serious concern was expressed by the Execut ive 
Commi t t ee for non-compl iance , inter alia, by the European Communi ty with 
its obligations uder the 1988 N O x P r o t o c o l 4 6 . Dur ing the meet ing of the 
Execut ive Commit tee , the delegate of the European Communi ty promised to 
submit all available data in early 2002 , "but noted that this would not cover 
all its m e m b e r Sta tes" and recognized that more pressure on the M e m b e r 
States that had not provided the required emiss ion would be n e c e s s a r y 4 7 . 
3.2. Convention on the Protection of the Alps 
The Alpine Convent ion is the first multilateral treaty specifically 
devoted to the organisat ion of regional co-operat ion in one mounta in area 
with its distinct environmental , economic , cultural and social features. The 
Alpine Convent ion binds eight States (Austria, France , Germany , Italy, 
Liechtenstein, M o n a c o , Slovenia and Switzer land) and the European Union 
and is comple ted by nine Protocols : Protocol on Nature Protection and 
Landscape Conservat ion (Chambéry , 20 December 1 9 9 4 ) 4 8 , Protocol on 
Mounta in Agricul ture (Chambéry , 20 December 1 9 9 4 ) 4 9 , Protocol on 
Regional Planning and Sustainable Deve lopment (Chambéry , 20 December 
1 9 9 4 ) 5 0 , Protocol on Mounta in Forests (Brdo, 27 February 1 9 9 6 ) 5 1 , Protocol 
on Tour i sm (Bled, 16 October 1 9 9 8 ) 5 2 , Protocol on Soil Protection (Bled, 16 
44. See The Fifth Report of the Implementation Committee, Doc. EB. AIR/2002/2 
of 30 September 2002, p. 8 ff. 
45. See Report cit., supra note 42, para. 26 and Decisions 2003/4-8, adopted by 
the Executive Body on 6 January 2004, Doc. Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/79/Add. 1 of 6 
January 2004. 
46. Decision 2001/4, Report of the Nineteenth Session cit., supra note 36, Annex 
IV. 
47. Ibidem, para. 47. 
48. BU, 99L83/D. 
49. BU, 99L83/C. 
50. Sf7,991:83/B. 
51. BU, 99L83/E. 
52. BU, 99L83/H. 
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October 1 9 9 8 ) 5 3 , Protocol on Energy (Bled, 16 October 1 9 9 8 ) 5 4 , Protocol on 
Transport (Lucern, 31 October 2 0 0 0 ) 5 5 and Protocol on Sett lement of 
Disputes (Lucerne, 31 October 2 0 0 0 ) 5 6 . All the protocols entered into force at 
the international level on 18 December 2002 , but only Austr ia , Germany , 
Liechtenstein and Slovenia are currently bound by all these i n s t r u m e n t s 5 7 
(information updated as at 8 March 2004). 
The establishment of a non compl iance-procedure is not explicitly 
envisaged under the Alpine Convent ion. A report ing system, based on the 
information given by the contract ing Part ies about their progress in 
implement ing the Convent ion and its Protocols , is regulated by Art . 5, para. 4, 
6 g) , and Art . 8, para. 6 a) , of the Convent ion. The information is "analysed" 
by the Standing Commi t t ee (consist ing of delegates of the Contract ing 
Parties) and "repor ted" to the Conference of the Parties (the Alpine Con-
ference) (Art. 8, para. 6) , which "shall take no te" ("prend connaissance") of 
the information (Art. 6, para. g)) . 
In November 2002, the Vl l th Alpine Conference adopted a decision 
providing for the establ ishment of a Moni tor ing Mechan i sm on the Com-
pliance of the Alpine Convent ion and its Implement ing Protocols (Mécan isme 
de verification du respect de la Convent ion alpine et de ses protocols 
d ' a p p l i c a t i o n ) 5 8 . 
Objectives: The a im of the procedure is to ensure the effective imple-
mentat ion of the obligations under taken by the Parties to the Convent ion and 
its implement ing Protocols . The mechan ism has a consultat ive, non-confron-
tational, non-judicial and non-discr iminatory nature and operates with no 
53. Bt/, 99L83/F. 
54. fli/,991:83/G. 
55. BU, 991:83/1. 
56. Bi/,991:83/J. 
57. All the Protocols entered into force for Austria, Germany and Liechtenstein 
on 18 December 2002, for Slovenia on 28 January 2004. The Protocols on Agriculture 
and on Settlement of Disputes entered into force for France on 15 February 2003. The 
Protocols on Regional Planning, Tourism, Soil Protection and Settlement of Disputes 
entered into force for Monaco on 27 April 2003. 
58. On the non-compliance procedure under the Alpine Convention and its 
protocols see: ENDERLIN: "A Compliance Mechanism within the Alpine Convention", 
in TREVES, PINESCHI and FODELLA (eds.): International Law and Protection of 
Mountain Areas, Milan, 2002, p. 159 ff.; ENDERLIN: "A Different Compliance 
Mechanism", EPL, 2003, p. 155 ff.; PINESCHI: "The Convention for the Protection of 
the Alps and Its Protocols: Evaluation and Expectations", in TREVES, PINESCHI and 
FODELLA (eds.): Sustainable Development of Mountain Areas. Legal Perspectives 
beyond Rio and Johannesburg, Milan, 2004, p. 191 ff. 
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prejudice for the procedure established by the Protocol on Peaceful 
Set t lement of Disputes . 
Institutional mechanisms: The decision of the Alpine Conference pro-
vides for the es tabl ishment of a Reviewing Commi t tee (Comité de veri-
fication), which considers issues of implementa t ion and compl iance and 
makes appropriate recommenda t ions to the Alpine Conference. In particular, 
the tasks of the Commi t t ee include: a) considerat ion of situations of possible 
non-compl iance by the Parties with their obligations under the Convent ion 
and its implement ing Protocols ; b) preparat ion of a report on the state of 
implementa t ion of the Convent ion and its Protocols with draft decisions and 
recommendat ions ; c) assistance to the Part ies, at their request, in the imple-
ment ion of the Convent ion and its Protocols . 
The Reviewing Commi t tee is composed of delegates of the Part ies to the 
Convent ion and delegates of the observers which are admit ted to take part in 
the meet ings of the Standing Commit tee . 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure: Situations may be 
referred to the Reviewing Commi t t ee by contract ing Part ies and observers 
(para. 2.3). The provision is sufficiently vague to allow a Party to tr igger the 
procedure against itself. Not having been ment ioned by the decision under 
considerat ion, territorial authorit ies cannot refer situations to the Reviewing 
Commit tee . However , nothing prevents territorial authorit ies from acting 
through a Contract ing Party or authorized observers . 
Information gathering: In order to perform its functions, the Reviewing 
Commi t tee bases its deliberations on information at its disposal . It m a y 
request supplementary information to the Parties, consider information from 
other sources and, with the authorization of the Party concerned, collect 
information in the territory of that Party. 
Outcome: On the basis of the reports of the Reviewing Commit tee , the 
Alpine Conference may adopt decisions or recommendat ions . Measures 
include: 
a) advice and assistance to a Party on issues of compl iance with the 
Convent ion and its Protocols ; 
b) support to a Party in the formulation of a strategy of compl iance with 
the Convent ion and its Protocols ; 
c) appointment of experts to give assistance to the Party concerned; 
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d) with the consent of the Party concerned, collection of information in 
its territory in order to single out problems of implementa t ion and 
possible measures ; 
e) adoption of measures a imed at promot ing co-operat ion among in-
terested Part ies, i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l organisat ions and non-govern-
menta l organisat ions; 
f) call to the Party concerned to adopt a strategy of compl iance; 
g) request for a t imetable on the implementa t ion of the Convent ion and 
its Protocols . 
Practice: The first meet ing of the Reviewing Commi t tee was held in 
Berlin on 6 and 7 October 2 0 0 3 5 9 . Dur ing the meet ing the attention was 
focussed on the drafting of a standard mode l for the periodic reports sub-
mitted by the Part ies. It was agreed that the model , drafted in the form of a 
quest ionnaire, should be approved before the end of 2004 in order to al low the 
Part ies to submit their reports , expected at the end of August 2005 , in 
accordance wi th the standard model . 
3.3. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic 
The purpose of the O S P A R Convent ion is to protect the mar i t ime area 
of the North-East Atlantic against the adverse effects of human activities so 
as to prevent and el iminate pollution, safeguard human health, conserve 
mar ine ecosys tems and, when pract icable , restore mar ine areas which have 
been adversely affected. Belg ium, Denmark , Finland, France , Germany , 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg , the Nether lands , Norway , Portugal , Spain, 
Sweden , Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the European Union are 
Part ies to the Convent ion. 
Under Art. 23 of the O S P A R Convent ion, the Commiss ion (a body 
composed of one representat ive for each contract ing Party) shall "(a) on the 
basis of the periodical reports referred in Article 22 and any other report 
59. See Report of the Presidency of the Reviewing Committee to the 27"' Meeting 
of the Standing Committee (Innsbruck, 25-27 February 2004). Delegates of eight 
Parties to the Alpine Convention (Austria, European Community, France, Germany, 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Slovenia and Switzerland) attended the meeting; delegates of four 
NGOs (ARGE ALP, CIPRA, Club Arc Alpin and IUCN) attended the meeting as 
observers. 
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submit ted by the Contract ing Part ies, assess their compl iance with the 
Convent ion and the decisions and recommendat ions adopted thereunder; (b) 
when appropriate , decide upon and call for steps to bring about full com-
pl iance with the Convent ion, and decisions adopted thereunder, and p romote 
the implementa t ion of recommendat ions , including measures to assist a 
Contract ing Party to carry its obl igat ions". 
Wi th a view to implement ing these obligations, the O S P A R Commiss ion 
adopted an Act ion Plan for 1997-1998 during its first annual meet ing (Sintra, 
20-24 July 1998). The Act ion Plan included the goal of establishing a 
compl iance mechan i sm and a revised Standard Implementa t ion Repor t ing and 
Assessment Procedure . The Act ion Plan for 1998-2003 adopted at the 
Ministerial Meet ing of the Ospar Commiss ion (Sintra, 22-23 July 1998) 
includes a section on "Compl iance and effectiveness", which states that the 
Commiss ion will assess reports of contract ing Parties on the implementa t ion 
of p rogrammes and measures adopted under the Convent ion and assess the 
effectiveness of these p rogrammes and m e a s u r e s 6 0 . 
Objectives: The a im of the procedure is to review compl iance and assist 
Parties in the implementa t ion of, and compl iance with, the Convent ion and 
the decisions and recommenda t ions adopted thereunder. 
Institutional mechanisms: The O S P A R Commiss ion shall assess com-
pliance and take measures to assist Parties in carrying out their obligations. 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure: A periodical 
review on Contract ing Par t ies ' activities is m a d e by the O S P A R Commiss ion . 
Information gathering: Compl iance with the Convent ion and further 
decisions and recommenda t ions is assessed by the O S P A R Commiss ion on 
the basis of the periodical reports submit ted by the Contract ing Part ies. 
Outcome: The wording of Art . 23 of the O S P A R Convent ion is rather 
vague. In the end, it is up to the Commiss ion to decide on the substance of the 
measures which shall be adopted to promote compl iance . 
Practice: In accordance wi th the t imetable specified in the Standard 
Implementa t ion Report ing and Assessment Procedure , Contract ing Part ies 
submit reports on their implementa t ion of O S P A R Decis ions and Recom-
mendat ions . Mos t decisions and recommendat ions applicable under the 
O S P A R Convent ion have , in addition to a format for report ing on com-
60. On the mechanism of reporting and compliance under the OSPAR 
Convention, see WOLFRUM: Means cit., p. 40-41; L A FAYETTE: "The OSPAR 
Convention Comes into Force: Continuity and Progress", The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, 1999, p. 247 ff., at p. 258-259. 
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pliance, an implementat ion report format to assess their effectiveness. In 2000 
the O S P A R Commiss ion decided to publish an assessment of implementat ion 
reports for three decisions and four r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 6 1 . 
3.4. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
The Árhus Convent ion was concluded in 1998 with a im to grant the 
public rights and impose on Parties and public authorithies obligations on 
access to information, public participation in decis ion-making and access to 
jus t ice in environmental matters . Twenty-seven States are currently Part ies to 
the Convent ion (information updated as at 8 March 2004) . 
Procedures for the review of compl iance of the Árhus Convent ion were 
agreed by the Part ies in 2002, during their first meet ing (decision I / 7 6 2 ) . The 
Parties acted under the mandate of Art. 15 of the Árhus Convent ion, which 
requires the Meet ing of the Part ies to establish "optional a r rangements of a 
non-confrontational, non judicial and consultat ive nature for reviewing 
compl iance with the provisions of this Convent ion. These ar rangements shall 
allow for appropriate public involvement and may include the option of 
considering communica t ions from member s of the public on matters related 
to this Convent ion" . 
Objectives: T h e a im of the procedure is to review compl iance by Parties 
with their obligations under the Convent ion by means of non-confrontational, 
non-judicial and consultat ive measures . 
Institutional mechanisms: A Compl iance Commi t tee has been esta-
bl ished with the task to examine compl iance issues and m a k e appropriate 
recommenda t ions to the Meet ing of the Part ies. In particular, the tasks of the 
Commi t tee include: a) considerat ion of submissions, referral or c o m m u -
nications on Parties compl iance with their obligations under the Convent ion; 
b) preparat ion, at the request of the Meet ing of the Part ies, of a report on 
compl iance with or implementa t ion of the provisions of the Convent ion; 
61. OSPAR Annual Report 1998/1999, para. 7.2. 
62. Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Lucca, 21-23 October 2002), Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2 of 17 
December 2002. Decision 1/7 (31 October 2002) is also available on the web-site: 
http.//www.unece.org/env/pp/mopl/decision. 1.7.e.doc. 
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c) monitor ing, assessment and facilitation of the implementat ion of and 
compl iance with the report ing requirements under Art. 10, para. 2, of the 
Convent ion. The reports of the Commi t tee are available to the public. 
The Compl iance Commi t tee is composed of eight member s , nationals of 
the Part ies and Signatories of the Convent ion, nominated by the Meet ing of 
the Part ies. The member s of the Commi t tee serve in their personal capacity. 
They are elected on the basis of nominat ions m a d e by the Part ies and the 
Signatories of the Convent ion and by the non-governmenta l organizat ions 
which are entitled to participate as observers at the meet ings of the Parties. 
Methods of triggering the non-compliance procedure: The non-
compl iance procedure may be invoked by: 
— one or more Parties to the Árhus Convent ion in respect of another 
Par ty ' s compl iance with its obligations; 
— a Party in respect to itself (despite its best endeavours , the Party 
concludes that it is unable to comply fully with is obligations under 
the Convent ion) ; 
— the Secretariat in respect to any Party to the Árhus Convent ion 
(during the preparation of its reports submit ted in accordance with 
the Convent ion ' s report ing requirements , the Secretariat becomes 
aware of possible non-compl iance by any Party with its obligations); 
— one or more member s of the p u b l i c 6 3 in respect of a Pa r ty ' s 
compl iance , unless that Party has notified the Deposi tary that it is 
unable to accept, for a per iod of not more than four years , the 
considerat ion of such communica t ions by the Commit tee . 
Information gathering: In order to perform its functions, the Compl iance 
Commi t tee may request further information on mat ters under its considerat ion 
and consider any relevant information submitted to it. It can also seek the 
services of experts and advisers as appropriate and, with the authorization of 
the Party concerned, to collect information in the territory of that Party. 
Outcome: The Meet ing of the Parties may adopt one or more of the 
following measures : 
a) provide advice and facilitate assistance to individual Part ies regar-
ding the implementat ion of the Convent ion; 
b) make recommendat ions to the Part ies concerned; 
63. Under Art. 2, para. 4, of the Árhus Convention "public" means: "one or more 
natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their 
associations, organizations or groups". 
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c) request the Party concerned to submit a strategy, including a t ime 
schedule, to the Compl iance Commi t t ee regarding the achievement 
of compl iance with the Convent ion and to report on the imple-
mentat ion of this strategy; 
d) in cases of communica t ions from the public , m a k e recommenda t ions 
to the Party concerned on specific measures to address the mat ter 
raised by the m e m b e r of the publ ic ; 
e) issue declarations of non-compl iance ; 
f) issue caut ions; 
g) suspend, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law 
concerning the suspension of the operat ion of a treaty, the special 
r ights and privileges accorded to the Party concerned under the 
Convent ion; 
h) take such other non-confrontat ional , non-judicial and consultat ive 
measures as m a y be appropriate . 
Practice: Dur ing its first three meet ings (17-18 March and 18-19 
September 2003 , 22-23 January 2004) , the Compl iance Commi t tee did not 
address concrete cases of non-compl iance , as its attention was focussed on the 
elaboration of its internal procedures . 
4 . NON-COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES CURRENTLY 
UNDER NEGOTIATION 
The adopt ion of non-compl iance procedures is currently under nego-
tiation within a number of multi lateral environmental treaties. The relevant 
examples include: 
— the Convent ion to Comba t Desertification in Those Countr ies Expe-
riencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in 
Africa (Paris, 17 June 1994), hereinafter: Desertification Con-
v e n t i o n 6 4 , entered into force on 26 December 1996; 
— the Convent ion on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
64. S i / , 994:76. 
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(Rot terdam, 10 September 1998), hereinafter: P IC C o n v e n t i o n 6 5 , 
entered into force on 24 February 2004; 
— the Car tagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convent ion on Biological 
Diversi ty (Montreal , 29 January 2000) , hereinafter: Protocol on 
B i o s a f e t y 6 6 , entered into force on 11 Sep tember 2 0 0 3 6 7 ; 
— the Convent ion on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm, 22 M a y 
2001) , hereinafter: P O P ' s C o n v e n t i o n 6 8 , shall enter into force on 17 
M a y 2004. 
4 . 1 . The Convention to Combat Desertification 
T h e purpose of the Desertification Convent ion is to prevent and mitigate 
the effects of drought and desertification as well as to achieve sustainable 
development in affected areas by means of an integrated approach, addressing 
the physical , biological and socio-economic aspects of the process of 
desertification and drought. By 8 M a r c h 2004, 189 States and the European 
Union had b e c o m e Parties to the Convent ion. 
Art. 27 of the Desertification Convent ion states that: "The Conference of 
the Part ies shall consider and adopt procedures and institutional mechan i sms 
for the resolution of quest ions that may arise with regard the implementa t ion 
of the Convent ion" . At its fifth session (Geneva, 1-12 October 2001) , the 
Conference of the Part ies (COP) decided to establish the Commi t t ee for the 
Review of the Implementa t ion of the Convent ion (CRIC) , as a subsidiary 
body entrusted with the function of regularly reviewing the implementa t ion of 
the Convent ion (decision 1/COP.5). Dur ing the same Conference, an Ad Hoc 
Group of Exper ts ( A H G E ) agreed that any procedure and institutional 
mechan ism to resolve quest ions on implementa t ion of the Desertification 
65. BU, 998:68. 
66. BU, 992:42/A. 
67. 86 States and the European Community are currently bound to the Protocol 
(8 March 2004). Procedures and mechanisms on compliance under the Cartagena 
Protocol were adopted by the Conference of the Parties during its first meeting (Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 23-27 February 2004); unfortunately, the Decision of the Parties 
was made publicly available after the conclusion of the present contribution (8 March 
2004). See Decision BS-I/7, Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Biosafety, Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/15 of 14 April 2004, p. 98. 
68. BU, 2001:39/001. 
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Convent ion should be facilitative and non-confrontational in character. It was 
also noted, however , that further considerat ion would be required of the scope 
of Art. 27, "which could be understood as relating either to problems of 
implementat ion faced by the Parties to the Convent ion as a whole , or to 
difficulties experienced by individual Part ies in fulfilling their o b l i g a t i o n s " 6 9 . 
The situation is still unresolved as substantive decisions have not yet been 
adopted on the matter . The sixth C O P (Havana, 25 August - 5 September 
2003) simply decided to reconvene the A H G E during its seventh session "to 
examine further and make recommenda t ions on procedures and institutional 
mechan isms for the resolution of quest ions on i m p l e m e n t a t i o n " 7 0 . 
4.2. The PIC Convention 
The pr imary a im of the PIC Convent ion is to establish a legally binding 
reg ime giving import ing countries the information they need to identify 
potential hazards and exclude chemicals they cannot manage safely. By 3 
March 2004, 60 States and the European Union had become Parties to the 
Convent ion. 
Under Art . 17 of the PIC Convent ion, "The Conference of the Part ies, as 
soon as pract icable, develop and approve procedures and institutional 
mechan isms for determining non-compl iance with the provisions of this 
Convent ion and for t reatment of Parties found to be in non-compl iance" . In 
August 2003 , during the tenth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiat ing 
Commi t tee for an Internationally Legal ly Binding Instrument for the 
Applicat ion of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade ( INC) , the Chai r of the 
working group on compl iance r ecommended a draft text, containing 
Procedures and Institutional Mechan i sms for Handl ing Cases of Non-
Compl iance , to the Conference of the Part ies for its cons ide ra t i on 7 1 . The First 
Meet ing of the Conference of the Part ies to the PIC Convent ion will be held 
in Geneva , from 20 to 24 September 2004. 
69. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session (Geneva, 1-12 
October 2001), Doc. ICCD/COP (5)/l 1 of 5 April 2002, Annex VI, p. 28. 
70. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixth Session, Doc. ICDD/ 
COP(6)/l 1/Add. 1 of 7 November 2003. 
71. For the draft procedure see Doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC. 10/20 of 21 August 
2003. 
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4 .3 . The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
T h e purpose of the Car tagena Protocol is to protect biological diversity 
from the potential r isk posed by transfer, handl ing and use of living modified 
organisms. Art . 34 of the Protocol provides for the development of pro-
cedures and mechan i sms to ensure compl iance with its provisions. Accord ing 
to this rule, the Conference of the Part ies to the Convent ion on Biological 
Diversity, serving as the meet ing of the Part ies to this Protocol shall, at its 
first meet ing "consider and approve cooperat ive procedures and institutional 
mechan i sms to p romote compl iance with the provisions of this Protocol and 
to address cases of non-compl iance . These procedures and mechan i sms shall 
include provisions to offer advice or assistance, where appropria te" . As stated 
in the same article, the compl iance procedure shall be separate from, and 
without prejudice to, the dispute set t lement procedures and mechan isms 
envisaged by Art. 27 of the Biodiversi ty C o n v e n t i o n 7 2 . 
The first meet ing of the Conference of the Part ies will be held from 23 
to 27 February 2004 in Kuala Lumpur , Malaysia . Dur ing this meet ing, the 
C O P shall consider the draft procedures and mechan isms on compl iance that 
the Intergovernmental Commi t tee for the Car tagena Protocol on Biosafety 
( I C C P ) 7 3 discussed and developed in 2001 and 2002, at its second and third 
m e e t i n g 7 4 . 
4 .4 . The POPs Convention 
Persistent organic pollutant (POPs) are chemical substances that remain 
intact in the envi ronment for long periods, b e c o m e widely distributed 
geographical ly, accumula te in the fatty t issue of living organisms and are 
toxic to human beings and wildlife. The 2001 Stockolm Convent ion is a 
72. On the procedures for ensuring implementation of the Cartagena Protocol 
see: BURGIEL: "The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Taking the Steps from 
Negotiation to Implementation", RECIEL, 2002, p. 53 ss. at p. 57-58. 
73. The ICCP is entrusted with the mandate to undertake the preparations 
necessary for the first meeting of the Parties to the Protocol. The establishment of this 
provisional body was decided by the Conference of Parties to the Biodiversity 
Convention when the Protocol on Biosafety was adopted. 
74. For the text of the draft procedures see Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/8 
of 18 November 2003, Annex I. 
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global treaty a imed at setting out control measures cover ing the product ion, 
import , export , disposal and use of POPs . Fifty instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or adhesion are requested by the Convent ion for its 
entry into force. By 8 March 2004, 51 instruments had been deposited. 
Under Art . 17 of the P O P s Convent ion, " the Conference of the Parties 
shall, as soon as practicable, develop and approve procedures and institutional 
mechan i sms for determining non-compl iance with the provisions of this 
Convent ion and for the t reatment of Parties found to be in non-compl iance" . 
In June 2002 , the Intergovernmental Negotiat ing Commi t t ee ( INC) 
drafted a note, containing a summary of issues addressed in the deve lopment 
of non-compl iance regimes adopted or still under deve lopment under mult i-
lateral environmental agreements . It called for comment s from its member s 
on the e lements identified in its note and requested the Secretariat to develop 
a draft model for a non-compl iance procedure under the P O P s C o n v e n t i o n 7 5 . 
Dur ing its next meet ing, with the documenta t ion prepared by the Secretariat 
on the subject, the I N C invited the delegat ions interested to exchange views 
on issues on possible non-compl iance reg ime and to set up an informal group 
to work on i t 7 6 . However , any decision was left to the first Conference of the 
Part ies. 
5. THE PROPOSED CENTRE FOR THE PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
In 2001 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Group of 
E x p e r t s 7 7 with the a im of studying possible ways to improve and facilitate the 
prevention and solution of environmental disputes at the international level. 
On the basis of a feasibility study drafted by a sub-group of e x p e r t s 7 8 , in 
September 2003 the Italian Government proposed the es tabl ishment of a 
"Cent re for the Prevent ion and M a n a g e m e n t of Environmenta l Dispu tes" 
75. Doc. UNEP/POPS/INC.6/17 of 31 January 2002. 
76. Doc. UNEP/POPs/INC.7/28 of 18 July 2003, para. 126-131. For a detailed 
survey of the seventh session of the INC, see "Preparing for Entry into Force", EPL, 
2003, p. 249 ff. 
77. Prof. Domenico Da Empoli, Francesco Francioni, Sergio Marchisio, Tullio 
Scovazzi, Attila Tanzi and Tullio Treves are members of the Group of experts. 
78. The feasibility study was drafted by a sub-group of experts composed by 
Tullio Scovazzi, Attila Tanzi, Laura Pineschi and Roberta Garabello. 
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(hereinafter: the Centre) during different meet ings of two working groups of 
the European Counci l , C O J U R (Commit tee "Internat ional L a w " ) and 
C O M A R (Commit tee "Mar i t ime L a w " ) . T h e proposal a ims to strengthen 
European and international mechan i sms for the prevent ion and management 
of environmental disputes through the establ ishment of a mult i -purpose 
institution entrusted with the tasks of assistance, fact-finding and mediat ion. 
5.1. The Functions of the Centre 
The Italian proposal arises from the assumption that the concept of 
prevention and managemen t of environmental disputes includes three diffe-
rent functions: assistance, fact-finding and mediat ion. Taking into account the 
peculiarit ies of each given case, one or two or even all the above functions 
should be performed. 
Assis tance "wou ld be provided upon request by any State or 
international organisation which needs help in facing a quest ion related to the 
protection of the envi ronment or use of natural resources . The quest ion may 
require specific scientific, technical or legal expert ise. It m a y also involve 
monitor ing. After the request is received, an assis tance- team composed of 
experts included in the lists kept by the Centre would be established to work 
in close co-operat ion with the representat ives of the request ing party. If the 
quest ion has a t ransboundary re levance, all the States concerned should be 
informed of it and invited to part icipate on an equal basis in the work of the 
assis tance-team. W h e n appropriate , the assis tance- team could elaborate a 
report , containing its advice and recommendat ions . The assis tance- team could 
also directly participate in the carrying out of certain activities, such as 
environmental impact s tatements or the training of local p e r s o n n e l " 7 9 . 
A fact-finding body would be established upon request by any affected 
State or international organisation "that desires to de termine the existence and 
characters of a situation of fact relevant to the protection of the envi ronment 
or use of natural resources . If the quest ion has a t ransboundary re levance, all 
the States concerned should be informed of it and invited to present on an 
79. Italian Government's proposal for the settlement of a Centre for the 
Prevention and Management of Environment Disputes, para. 11. The full text of the 
proposal can be read in CICIRIELLO (a cura di): La protezione del mare Mediterráneo 
daWinquinamento. Problemi vecchi e nuovi, Napoli, 2003, p. 291 ff. 
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equal footing their views to the fact-finding body. Such body submits a report 
to the parties concerned, setting forth its findings and the reasons t h e r e o f ' 8 0 . 
Finally, the Centre might be used to perform a mediat ion/good offices 
function "if requested by all the part ies involved in a dispute relevant to the 
protection of the envi ronment or use of natural resources . The aims of 
mediat ion/good offices are, inter alia, to facilitate communica t ion be tween the 
disputants, to encourage them to re-evaluate their posit ions and to offer 
compromise suggestions or solutions. The body in charge of mediat ion/good 
offices would rely on the co-operat ion of the part ies in order to perform in the 
mos t expedit ious and effective way its task of promot ing an agreement 
settling the d i s p u t e " 8 1 . 
In principle access to the Centre should be al lowed to States and 
international organisat ions. However , the opportunity to allow free access to 
territorial entities, such as German Lander and Italian Regions , non-
governmental organisat ions and corporat ions is also taken into considerat ion 
in the proposal and r ecommended for further d i s c u s s i o n 8 2 . 
In the establ ishment of the Centre a central role should be played by the 
European Union. T h e Centre could be envisaged as a body operat ing within 
the European Union legal f r a m e w o r k 8 3 . M e m b e r States and the European 
Union itself could take advantage of the services of the Centre . But the 
proposal is particularly addressed to mee t the concerns of developing 
countries and countries in transition to a market economy at a m o m e n t when 
the European Union becomes a regional organisation composed of 25 
M e m b e r States. The Centre might be established either under a European 
Communi ty legal instrument or under an international treaty. 
The financial effort deriving from the establ ishment of the Centre would 
be modest . Italy proposes "a ' l ight ' and low-cost structure which would have 
l imited staff and budget and would draw from expert ise already existing 
within the European Union institutions and its M e m b e r S t a t e s " 8 4 . 
8 0 . Ibidem, para. 12 . 
8 1 . Ibidem, para. 1 3 . 
8 2 . Ibidem, para. 9 . 
8 3 . For an assessment of possibile conflicts and overlappings with European 
environmental policy and European institutions, see para. 7 - 1 1 of the Italian Proposal. 
8 4 . Ibidem, para. 7 . See also Annex III of the Italian Proposal, CICIRIELLO (a cura 
di): La protezione cit., p. 3 1 5 . 
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5.2. Relationship between Non-Compliance Mechanisms and Pro-
cedures under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the 
Proposed Centre for the Prevention and Management of 
Environmental Disputes 
Any conflict be tween the proposed Centre and existing institutions or 
mechan isms , such as the Optional Rules for Arbitrat ion of Disputes Relat ing 
to Natural Resources and/or the Envi ronment , as well as the corresponding 
Draft Optional Rules for Concil iat ion, both adopted within the f ramework of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitrat ion of the H a g u e 8 5 , is to be excluded. In fact, 
competences in the field of concil iat ion and arbitration would not be given to 
the Centre . 
Possible conflicts and overlappings be tween existing non-compl iance 
procedures and the functions of the proposed Centre for the Prevent ion and 
M a n a g e m e n t of Environmenta l Problems may occur and should be carefully 
taken into consideration. Nevertheless , it is bel ieved that the establ ishment of 
the proposed Centre might fill a gap in international environmental law. The 
following reasons may be put forward. 
a) The non-compl iance procedures which have been examined in the 
preceding paragraphs purport the same aim: to ensure the achieve-
ment of c o m m o n environmental goals by means of prevention and 
strengthened co-operat ion, rather than by means of sanction. It 
would be improper , however , to think that the proliferation of non-
compl iance procedures is evolving towards the progressive establish-
ment of a uniform reg ime on compl iance with environmental treaty 
obligations. Whi le non-compl iance procedures and mechan isms are 
very similar in their nature and content , remarkable (or, at least, not 
minor) discrepancies are evident, because procedural and institu-
tional mechan isms are tailored to serve the purpose of individual 
treaties. Nothing prevents the es tabl ishment of a new non-com-
pliance mechan i sm aimed at achieving a broader scope. In any event , 
the proposed Centre is not going to replace existing non-compl iance 
8 5 . These rules are available on the Permanent Court of Arbitration's website, 
http://www.pca-cpa.org. For an examination of this system see RATLIFF: "The PC A 
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the 
Environment", Leiden Journal of International Law, 2 0 0 1 , p. 8 8 7 ff. and VESPA: "An 
Alternative to an International Environmental Court? The PCA's Optional Arbitration 
Rules for Natural Resources and/or the Environment", The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals, 2 0 0 3 , p. 2 9 5 ff. 
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regimes; it will s imply provide an additional procedure for preven-
ting and managing international disputes on the envi ronment with 
due attention to all the interests involved and on the basis of the 
international obligation to co-operate for the fulfilment of c o m m o n 
objectives. 
b) The pr imary a im of existing non-compl iance procedures is to ensure 
a return to compl iance with treaty obl igat ions.The proposed Centre 
would be able to provide a forum offering a wider choice of mecha-
n isms available to the entities concerned. Three functions, namely 
assistance, fact-finding and mediat ion will be carried out by the 
Centre . Accord ing to the peculiari t ies of each given case, one or two 
or even all the functions might be performed. 
c) Each treaty is a "self-contained" regime, with specific limits rat ione 
personae and ratione mater iae . As a consequence , existing non-com-
pliance procedures strictly operate within the scope of the individual 
treaty under which they have been established and can only give 
assistance to, and address non-compl iance of, Contract ing Part ies to 
that single treaty. If a broad consensus exists in international 
environmental law towards the deve lopment of non-compl iance 
procedures , it is also true that the number of mechan i sms and 
procedures which have been established is still quite small . Many of 
these mechan i sms have not yet b e c o m e operat ive. Gaps need still to 
be filled. N o non-compl iance procedures have been established 
within treaties regulat ing important sectors of international environ-
menta l law, such as the prevention of industrial hazards , or the 
regulation of international watercourses . As far as the prevention of 
marine pollution is concerned, the non-compl iance procedure under 
Art. 23 of the O S P A R Convent ion remains the sole precedent . The 
proposed Centre does not serve the interest of a single treaty. Its 
functions are to be performed with reference to quest ions which are 
related to the protect ion of the envi ronment or use of natural 
resources in general . A specific case may involve the scope of two or 
more different environmental treaties. In such a situation, the 
es tabl ishment of the proposed Centre would be able to bring about 
further advantages: intersectoral issues could c o m e into consi-
deration; the interaction be tween obligations arising from different 
environmental treaties could be appraised; synergies could be 
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developed on the basis of the exper ience gained in different environ-
mental fields. 
d) T h e bodies operat ing the non-compl iance system within different 
environmental treaties are, with few except ions , political bodies 
composed of States part ies. The principle of impartiali ty is not 
a s s u r e d 8 6 . T h e proposed Centre - which in the exercise of its 
functions will be guided by the principle of impartial i ty - will 
provide to States and other entities having access to it the services of 
experts acting in their personal capacity. This could contr ibute to the 
progressive building of confidence in the functions performed by the 
Centre . 
e) Measures m a y be taken to assist Part ies in carrying out their 
obligations within certain non-compl iance reg imes adopted or still 
under development under multilateral environmental agreements . 
However , the effective undertaking of activities of assistance on 
behalf of interested parties depends on the readiness and capacity of 
the other contract ing Part ies to co-operate . T h e proposed Centre will 
assist all the Part ies concerned at the highest level of expert ise, 
without discrimination. As they are offered by a pre-established 
body, the services of the Centre will not be subject to further 
formalities and condit ions which could delay its effectiveness. 
f) A critical issue that has been raised about certain non-compl iance 
procedures is the quest ion of the legal consequences of these 
8 6 . For instance, as far as the Montreal Protocol non-compliance procedure is 
concerned, it has been correctly observed: "It is questionable whether such political 
institutions [the Implementation Committee and the Meeting of the Parties] consisting 
of governmental representatives can always act impartially. More importantly, it still 
is unclear whether such bodies can responsibly act as a sincere trusteeship of the 
global commons - the stratospheric ozone layer. Unlike international judicial ins-
titutions or human rights committees, NCP regime operators are not independent and 
do not necessarily have professional prestige. In addition, we should not overlook the 
confidential aspects of the Montreal NCP regime's decision-making process, which 
are often crucial in understanding the hidden meaning of the internal regime ins-
titutions' decisions", YOSHIDA: Soft Enforcement cit., p. 1 4 0 . In general, see also 
SZELL: The Development cit., p. 1 0 8 : "(. . .) it has been suggested that these 
Committees would be more efficient if they were composed of elected individuals 
rather than elected countries. Such nominations, it is said, would result in increased 
objectivity, greater expertise and more consistent attendance at meetings of the 
Committee. Some countries, however, have been nervous of recommending such a 
step, although it has been shown to work well in other contexts. Such a change is 
unlikely in the immediate future. Parties will remain cautious about the risk that the 
committees will have too much independence, at least until they have acquired greater 
familiarity with, and confidence in, their work". 
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procedures on the Parties c o n c e r n e d 8 7 . A clear-cut solution on this 
issue could be clearly envisaged by the instruments providing for the 
establ ishment of the proposed Centre . 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The prevention and solution of international disputes, a fundamental aim 
of the United Nat ions Charter , assumes particular impor tance in the field of 
the environment , whose protection t ranscends the level of mere reciprocal 
relations be tween States. The risk that environmental degradat ion can produce 
new international conflicts is sharply underscored already in the Brundt land ' s 
R e p o r t 8 8 . But the perception that certain environmental risks can be the 
source of detr imental consequences very close to (or even worse than) those 
produced by armed conflicts emerges also in an Agenda of Peace , the report 
that the United Nat ions Secretary-General drafted in 1992 to suggest new 
ways for strengthening and making more efficient the capacity of the 
Organizat ion to prevent new conflicts by means of prevent ive diplomacy, 
peace-making and p e a c e - k e e p i n g 8 9 ("A porous ozone shield could pose a 
greater threat to an exposed populat ion than a hostile a r m y " ) 9 0 . 
It is also generally acknowledged, however , that traditional dispute 
set t lement mechan i sms cannot function to address the material breach by 
States of international environmental obligations. Different organs of the 
United Nations have raised the issue on several occasions. Agenda 21 clearly 
suggests that new methods should be developed ("In the area of avoidance 
and sett lement of disputes, States should further study and consider methods 
to broaden and make more effective the range of techniques available at 
present, taking into account, among others, relevant exper ience under existing 
87. See WERKSMAN: Compliance cit., p. 73 ff. and BRUNNÉE: The Kyoto Procol 
cit., p. 278. 
88. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, "Our 
Common Future", U.N. Doc. A/42/427 of 4 August 1987, Chapter 11. 
89. U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992, para. 1. 
90. Ibidem, para. 13. See also the Report of the Secretary-General on Prevention 
of Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/55/985-S/2O01/574 of 7 June 2001 ("An investment 
in long-term structural prevention is ultimately an investment in sustainable develop-
ment (...) Effective conflict prevention is a pre-requisite for achieving and main-
taining sustainable peace, which in turn is a pre-requisite for sustainable develop-
ment", para. 10). 
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international agreements , instruments or institutions and, where appropriate, 
their implement ing mechan isms such as modali t ies for dispute avoidance and 
sett lement ( . . . ) " ) 9 1 . Similar assert ions can be found as well in more recent 
documents of the United Nat ions , where new imaginat ive solutions are 
warmly r ecommended ("The t imes call for thinking afresh, for striving 
together and for creat ing new ways to overcome crisis ( . . . ) The changed face 
of conflict today requires us to be percept ive, adaptive, creative and 
courageous , and to address s imultaneously the immedia te as well as the root 
causes of c o n f l i c t " 9 2 ; "Sustainable development requires new ways of making 
public policy decisions ( . . . ) This includes changing institutional and legal 
f r a m e w o r k s " 9 3 ) . In principle, however , as far as the prevention, management 
and solution of international environmental disputes are concerned, no 
concrete proposals and solutions can be found in these instruments . 
States practice shows that the warning of the United Nat ions , despite its 
vagueness , has been taken seriously and new solutions are presently being 
devised. In particular implementa t ion and enforcement of certain multilateral 
environmental agreements have been significantly improved by means of the 
adoption of specific non-compl iance mechan i sms and procedures . The most 
prominent examples have been reviewed in the previous paragraphs, but other 
initiatives in support of these developments (see, e.g., the U N E P Guidel ines 
on Compl iance with and Enforcement of Multi lateral Environmental 
A g r e e m e n t s 9 4 and the E C E Guidel ines for Strengthening Compl iance with 
and Implementa t ion of Multi lateral Environmenta l Agreements ( M E A S ) in 
the E C E R e g i o n 9 5 ) have also been undertaken at global and regional levels. 
States practice also shows, however , that non-compl iance mechan isms 
and procedures produce practical , but also l imited and, somet imes , not-
91. Agenda 21, Chapter 39, para. 10. The text of Agenda 21 is available on the 
web at the following site: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/ 
agenda2 hoc. htm. 
92. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General 
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60 
- S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995, para. 103. 
93. Information and Institutions for Decision-Making, Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 17/2001/PC/3 of 2 March 2001, par. 1. 
94. The Guidelines were adopted by the Governing Council of UNEP on 15 
February 2002. See Decision SS.VII/4, in Report of the Seventh Session of the 
Governing Council of UNEP (Cartagena, 13-15 February 2002), Doc. 
UNEP/GC/SS.VII/6 of 5 March 2002, p. 43. 
95. The Guidelines were adopted by the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on 20 March 2003. See Doc. 
ECE/CEP/107 of 20 March 2003. 
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complete ly satisfactory advantages . The lack of impartiali ty and the character 
of "self-contained" regime, with specific limits rat ione personae and ratione 
mater iae of each non-compl iance mechanism, are the most evident aspects of 
these limits. 
The Italian proposal which has been previously reviewed is far from 
being perfect. At the present stage it is a s imple suggestion that needs to be 
refined. Obviously, a more accurate deve lopment of the characterist ic 
features of the proposed Center has been deliberately pos tponed to a later 
stage, in considerat ion of the reactions to the project in different international 
fora. It would be fallacious, however , to ignore or to underest imate the 
proposal on the assumption that new methods of prevention, managemen t and 
set t lement of international envi ronmenta l disputes would be an unnecessary 
duplication of (or interfence with) existing non-compl iance procedures . The 
pr imary objective of these mechan i sms and the proposed Center is the same, 
i.e. to ensure compl iance with treaty obligations rather than reparation for a 
breach of an international obligation by the default ing State, but the w ay s to 
achieve this result are different and do not necessari ly overlap. The protection 
of the envi ronment can only benefit from a proposal which tries to safeguard 
different interests at stake by means of a new form of international co-
operation: a pre-establ ished mult i -purpose institution, offering a wide choice 
of available mechan i sms (assistance, fact-finding and mediat ion/good offices) 
and providing services of high-level experts acting in their personal capacity 
in an effective way and without unnecessary formalities and condit ions. 
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